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Feminist Pedagogy and
Education in Values

Mark T. Brown
University of Wisconsin Center-Marathon County

The teaching of value-laden courses in the social sciences and the
humanities, particularly philosophy and history, poses special demands
upon balance in course content and instructional technique. The western
tradition in ethical thought converges upon a specific approach to moral
problems, an approach that too often fails to connect with the concerns
of women, ethnic minorities, and other groups outside the cultural
mainstream. Moral problems are traditionally understood in terms of
competing ethical theories involving abstract moral principles. This type
of subject matter naturally lends itself to a deductive, lecture-oriented
instructional format. The structure of one or more ethical theories is
sketched, the key concepts defined, the basic principles analyzed, and the
moral problem itself resolved as an application of the ethical theory in
question. Many undergraduates implicitly reject this approach to value
conflict by rejecting the conclusions of apparently cogent arguments
derived from classical ethical theory. This phenomenon has prompted
reflective educators to reconsider their accustomed analytical tools and
the classroom atmosphere that use of those tools engenders.
In this essay, I will consider briefly an alternative approach to teaching
value-laden courses found in the feminist pedagogy inspired by the work
of Carol Gilligan and developed by Nell Noddings, among others (Gilligan, 1982; Noddings, 1984). To supplement the traditional hierarchy of
moral principles, Gilligan and Noddings urge greater emphasis upon the
web of interpersonal relations· and responsibilities embedded within the
social context in which moral dilemmas and value conflict arise. They
argue that the range of choice open to a moral agent depends crucially
upon the special personal relationships and emotional attachments of the
particular individuals involved. I will suggest that careful attention to these

217

218

To Improve the Academy

insights can result in more effective instruction in the critical assessment
of value conflicts and can point toward a model of undergraduate education that better prepares students to cope with difficult choices in their
own lives. Feminist pedagogy thus directs our attention toward both
alternative methods in the teaching of values and the values implicit in the
education students receive.

Two Models of Moral Development
Instruction regarding the moral, personal, and social policy implications of abortion illustrates the need for a fresh approach to learning about
values. Arguments that take as premises the role in ethical theory of such
personal characteristics as consciousness, rationality, and the experience
of pleasure and pain, and draw conclusions concerning the moral status
of the fetus often appear remote and aridly abstract to undergraduates.
Similarly, considerations of historical precedent, cost-benefit calculations, and the dictates of theological doctrine can leave undergraduates
unmoved, unconvinced, and uninterested.
Some educators are tempted to treat this kind of unresponsiveness as
evidence of incomprehension and moral immaturity. After al~ it is thought
that the issue of abortion clearly falls under these ethical principles or
within the scope of that legal precedent, or has such and such positive and
negative social consequences. The fault thus lies with the student for
failing to grasp the deductive subsumption of a value-laden issue, in this
case abortion, within a more inclusive intellectual framework.
This type of attitude from teachers often springs from a theory of
moral development associated with (but not endorsed by) the Harvard
psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg (Kohlberg, 1981). Moral development
is seen as a progressive detachment of personal and subjective attitudes
in favor of more neutral and objective categories of evaluation. Early
concentration upon personal rewards and punishment gives way to concern with social acceptance and respect for the conventional rules of the
family, group, and nation. At the pinnacle of moral development, moral
agents deduce rules of conduct from the fundamental principles of ethical
theory.
Carol Gilligan and others have subjected this model of moral
development to vigorous criticism. Gilligan found that the thinking of
many women who considered having an abortion would be classified as
merely conventional, and that these same women, when interviewed some
years later, actually had regressed on this scale of moral development.
Gilligan suggested that women and perhaps cultural minorities respond
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to issues of value conflict in a fashion that is different from, but not
necessarily incompatible with, this model. She argued that the history of
the personal relationships and the biographies of the people involved in
a value conflict can be crucial to an incisive analysis of the moral problem
that results, and that the women she interviewed implicitly recognized this.
In many situations, concentrating upon the details of social context can be
exactly the right approach, while premature attention to abstract moral
principles can be an unhelpful distraction. This alternative way of thinking
about moral problems is at once more accessible to large segments of the
population and more productive of genuine understanding of the concrete
reality of the clash of interests and claims of right. On this model of moral
development, student unresponsiveness to traditional ways of treating
value conflict reflects both the one-sided character of traditional ethical
analysis and student dissatisfaction with the teaching methods that are its
natural companion.
Conventional, teacher-centered instructional methods are seen as
guided by the judicial paradigm of blind justice. An ideal judge dispassionately dispenses rewards and punishments while maintaining strict
neutrality towards the persons involved. Traditionally in education, the
perspective of an uninvolved third party is seen as the proper vantage
point from which to describe social conflict. The web of interpersonal
connection is intentionally deleted from the judicial model of conflict
resolution; at the same time, instruction by deductive subsumption distracts attention from the details of social context that can bring to life the
diversity of social interaction.
Perhaps an attitude of studied impartiality is appropriate from a
governing official, but for those to whom they matter most, moral dilemmas are lived from within a specific interpersonal context. From the
perspective of the participants in a crisis situation, the bonds of family,
friendship, personal responsibility, and loyalty are absolutely crucial and
cannot be factored out of the equation without at the same time draining
the resulting analysis of cogency. For Gilligan, sensitivity to the role of
personal relationships should be seen as a means to achieve a realistic
assessment of the available options. In the classroom, concentrating upon
abstract legal, ethical, or religious principles can obscure the details of
interpersonal connection that many students intuitively believe to be
essential to a deep understanding of actual cases of value conflict.
Gilligan contends that this more immediate and contextual approach
to moral agency is to be found more frequently among girls and women
than among boys and men. She cites empirical studies that support this
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claim and traces this divergence in thought patterns to the dynamics of
psychosexual development. She argues persuasively that girls tend to
identify the developing self with their mothers and to see this connection
to an Other as essential to their social identity. In contrast, sex role
socialization for boys typically leads to a felt need to sever the psychological tie between self-image and mother-image. Boys and men often come
to see independence and self-reliance as signs of emotional maturity.
Partly as a result, classical liberal justifications of an inviolable sphere of
privacy and Kantian claims of the moral primacy of personal autonomy
strike many men as virtually self-evident maxims of conduct. Interference
in the affairs of another person is seen as wrong; non-interference is seen
as recognition of the equal rights of others.
Gilligan claims that the experience and psychology of many women
resonates more deeply with an interpretation of moral agency that takes
seriously the contextual background of social interaction. In this alternative interpretation of value conflict, selfiShness and self-absorption are
seen as wrong; helping others and maintaining the bonds of personal
connection are seen as right. Individuals are seen not as neutral bearers
of rights and centers of independent agency, but rather as persons defined
in large measure by their status within a network of special relationships
and emotional attachments. Many women think that the proper approach
to cases of value conflict resides not in the rational adjudication of
competing interests, but rather in drawing upon and maintaining existing
lines of interpersonal connection in order to restore and strengthen the
bonds of community and to satisfy all parties to the extent possible.
Gilligan does not claim that men invariably find the deductive approach most natural or that women in general adopt a more contextualist
attitude. Clearly, many men and many women exemplify both patterns of
thought, but the nearly exclusive emphasis in undergraduate education
upon deductive hierarchy often distorts the social reality of value conflict
and distorts it in a way more likely to be felt by women students than by
men students.

Implications for the Teaching of Values
What can (and what should) be done to address this kind of imbalance
in undergraduate education? In philosophy courses, contextualist interpretations of value judgements can be taught alongside the survey of
ethical theories, while the analysis of appropriate emotional response can
be conducted in conjunction with the analysis of moral argument. The
feminist critique of traditional models of moral development can be
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integrated into the review of ethical theory, and alternative frameworks
for the analysis of value conflict can be presented explicitly in the classroom; but one must not fall into the trap of embedding these ideas in yet
another lecture. Feminist pedagogy should inform both course content
and classroom management.
Social science and history courses, as well as courses specifically
designed to confront moral problems, could benefit from supplementing
primary source and textbook readings with case studies of value conflict.
Case studies bring home to students the immediacy of moral problems
and provide a useful format to display both abstract principles and the
relevance of social context. The use of case studies can be combined
effectively with cooperative learning techniques. Often students in groups
of four or five feel free to express their thoughts openly, especially when
the abstract concepts are pegged to a narrative describing named individuals involved in actual situations.

Implications for Values in Teaching
Recognition that the classroom itself is an arena of social interaction
and personal relationships is equally important. Highly structured,
teacher-oriented classroom management implicitly endorses a formal and
hierarchical model of social interaction. An instructor who models the
traditional deductive approach through well-organized lectures and readings also can model the contextualist approach by promoting a classroom
atmosphere in which nontraditional responses to questions of value
choice are welcomed.
Recent research has indicated that women students are more likely
to be discouraged from active participation in their own education. College professors, whether male or female, call upon the raised hands of
male students more often than the raised hands of female students,
interrupt their female students more frequently than their male students,
and, in general, are more likely to reward their male students with verbal
praise. Partly as a result, female students tend to be much more tentative
in the classroom. Women students typically frame their contributions in
the form of questions rather than assertions; and when declarative statements are made, they often will be prefaced by qualifications of subjectivity ("I feel that ... ") or followed by interrogative trailers (" ... don't you
think?"). Testimony from college teachers indicates that their behavior is
unintended and unconscious. Greater sensitivity to what Bernice Sandler
calls the "chilly classroom climate" for women can lead to just the sort of
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social diversity and learning by doing that feminist pedagogy has long
recommended.
Explicit avowals in the classroom of the insights of contextualist
accounts of value judgement should be reinforced by the teacher's implicit
recognition of the importance of personal relationships in the process of
education. Students should know that their understanding of the subject
is more significant to the instructor than the quantity of material covered,
the pace of instruction, or a pre-set sequence of assignments. To the extent
that the subject matter permits, syllabi should be flexible in the sense that
time is budgeted for "falling behind," expanding or contracting various
aspects of the course, and rearranging the sequence of topics studied.
More than anything else, grading discloses the distinctive and inherently unequal character of the teacher/student relationship. This asymmetry should be neither avoided nor denied. The importance of the details
of personal relationships in eduation as elsewhere is one of the key insights
of the view Gilligan and Noddings urge.
Teachers must view their subject matter through the eyes of their
students if students are to grasp and retain the material (Noddings, 1984).
The teacher's interpretation of course content needs to be presented in
language the student can grasp and in a form that encompasses the
student's motivation and (possibly ill-understood) goals. This ability to
include within their own subjectivity the subjectivity of the student is the
mark of effective teachers.
Grading threatens effective teacher/student relationships in part because it encourages the student to attempt a similar inclusion of the
teacher's subjectivity. Education can become an elaborate guessing game
for students in which academic success results in large measure from skill
in anticipating the teacher's instructional goals and preferred responses.
As long as colleges function in our society as professional certification
agencies, this type of student attitude is understandable and probably
inevitable, but certain types of evaluation procedures exacerbate the
problem. Exams and classroom management methods that depend upon
uncertainty of content or timing not only generate student anxiety, but also
tempt students to "psych out" their teacher. An evaluation instrument that
lists a number of essay questions, topics, or skills to be selected by the
instructor at the point of evaluation measures and promotes the tendency
of students to try to overcome the natural asymmetry of the teacher/student relationship. Unscheduled quizzes and unsolicited requests to
answer questions create a tense classroom atmosphere and perpetuate
the adversarial teacher/student relationship inherited from high school.
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Where course content permits, exams should be open-book and the
structure and timing of evaluation periods clearly forecast. If possible,
students should be permitted to rework course requirements if dissatisfied with an initial grade.

Conclusion
Much of what Gilligan, Noddings, and others urge has been understood and put into practice for years by good teachers. Nonetheless, a
perspicuous statement and justification of feminist pedagogy can point
toward unsuspected insights and wider use of methods that have proven
to be successful. Both deductive, lecture-oriented instructional methods
and the more informal interpersonal approach advocated by Noddings
and others have their place in value-laden courses, because real moral
problems have both cognitive/intellectual and social/emotional aspects.
An understanding of the multi-dimensional character of value conflicts
can make more immediately apparent the relevance of moral rules and
other general principles to appropriate behavior in morally complex
situations. Conversely, showing students how moral principles can guide
behavior by embedding them within classroom management can help
bring to life what once seemed a series of arid abstractions.
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